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Abstract  
 
Through the European controversy over agricultural biotechnology, genetically modified 
(GM) crops have been evaluated for an increasingly wide range of potential effects.  As the 
experimental phase has been extended into commercial practices, the terms for product 
approval have become more negotiable and contentious.   To analyse the regulatory conflicts, 
this paper links three theoretical perspectives: issue-framing, agri-environmental discourses, 
and technological development as a real-world experiment.   
 
Agri-biotechnological risks have been framed by contending discourses which attribute moral 
meanings to the agricultural environment.  Agri-biotech proponents have emphasised eco-
efficiency benefits which can remedy past environmental damage, while critics have framed 
‘uncontrollable risks’ in successively broader ways through ominous metaphors of 
environmental catastrophe.  Regulatory authorities have translated those metaphors into 
measurable biophysical effects. They anticipate and design commercial use as a ‘real-world 
experiment’, by assigning greater moral-legal responsibility to agro-industrial operators who 
handle GM products.   
 
Expert-regulatory debate reflexively considers the social discipline necessary to prevent harm, 
now more broadly defined than before.  Official procedures undergo tensions between 
predicting, testing and prescribing operator behaviour.  In effect, GM crops have been kept 
continuously ‘on trial’. 
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1  Introduction  
Through the European controversy over agricultural biotechnology, GM crops have been kept 
on continuous trial.  Their symbolic status has been disputed – e.g., as an environmentally-
friendly improvement in plant breeding, or as a risk-management problem, or as pollutants in 
themselves.  These products have been put on trial also in the scientific-managerial sense, as 
regards what risks must be tested and managed, as well as what responsibilities should be 
assigned to agro-industrial operators. 
 
This paper analyses how regulatory procedures have disputed and tightened the basis for 
commercial approval of GM products.  This analysis has two main stages:   
• how biotechnological risks have been framed by contending discourses, in turn 
leading regulatory authorities to extend their responsibility for potential effects of GM 
products; and 
• how commercial contexts have been simulated or designed as experiments for testing 
such effects and preventive measures. 
 
This paper first sketches relevant theoretical perspectives and then applies them to the case 
study.  For research methods, see the Acknowledgements section. 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Diagram 1:  Links among Theoretical Perspectives in the Case Study 
 
Note:  Arrows indicate how theoretical perspectives (in boxes)  
are linked through the analysis (in circles)  
 
 
 
 
Theory 1a: Issue-frames  
Collective action-frames 
produce shared meanings 
through culturally believable 
diagnoses. 
Each issue-frame defines the 
problems that need 
solutions. Policy process 
reconstructs the 
problem.  Experiments 
put GM crops on trial, 
while extending the 
boundaries of science. 
Stepwise procedure is 
extended into the 
commercial stage.  
Control measures assign 
moral responsibility to 
prevent harm.  
Theory 2: Experiments 
Risk assessment involves 
prediction and implicit 
prescription of behaviour. 
Real-world experiments 
test operator behaviour 
through scale-up.   
 
Agbiotech debate features 
contending moral frames.  
Managerialist frame 
translates ominous 
metaphors into measurable 
effects, thus scientising risk 
and protest. 
Theory 1b: Discourses 
The environment becomes a 
terrain of contested social values.  
Discourses moralise the agri-
environment as a socio-natural 
order. 
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2  Theoretical perspectives  
For an overview of the paper, Diagram 1 sketches how the analysis will link the three 
perspectives, as presented here in their own right. The first sub-section combines Theories 1a 
and 1b, i.e. issue framing and agri-environmental discourses.  The subsequent sub-section 
presents Theory 2, technological development as a real-world experiment. 
2.1  Contending discursive frames of agri-environmental issues 
In policy debate, contending frames define the societal problems that need solutions, argues 
Surel [1] (see Diagram 1, theory 1a, top).  When social movements seek policy change, they 
devise ‘collective action frames’. These help to produce shared meanings of issues, to 
mobilise adherents and resources, and thus to use or create new political opportunities for 
influence.  Resonance with public meanings depends less upon whether discursive claims 
have factual validity than upon whether they offer culturally-believable diagnoses of societal 
problems, argue Benford and Snow [2].   
 
Issue-framing has been widely analysed for agri-environmental discourses (see Diagram 1, 
theory 1b, lower left-hand corner).  European agriculture has been given diverse 
environmental meanings.  The wider countryside has been portrayed, for example, as an 
aesthetic landscape, a wildlife habitat, refuge from urban industry, local heritage, etc. – which 
agriculture may endanger or preserve.  Such framings have justified government policies 
which variously support farmers or discipline them so as to protect the environment. 
 
National agrarian beliefs have idealised agriculture in various ways.  In the UK since the early 
1990s, farmers have been portrayed as stewards who conserve the landscape.  This image has 
helped to justify government subsidies on a new basis.  In response, environmental 
campaigners have demanded that the government substantiate its claims for that stewardship 
role [3].  Such pressures have left farmers more vulnerable to criticism, demands and 
discipline.   
 
Since the mid-1990s, the UK government has portrayed farm waste as environmental ‘crime’, 
a concept which attaches blame and thus moralises risk. Livestock effluent has been portrayed 
as ‘agricultural pollution’, i.e. as matter out of place, thus justifying laws which impose  
greater responsibility upon farmers [4].  Moral visions are attached to the proper social 
ordering of the agro-environment; the ‘polluter pays’ principle assigns responsibility for 
disorderly run-off of pesticides and fertilisers [5].  Government promotes technical solutions 
to the overall agrochemical problem, while environmentalists criticise these remedies as 
unrealistic and as unable to halt the ‘pesticide treadmill’, given its systemic causes [6].   
 
In analogous ways, contending frames of agricultural production arose in the controversy over 
bovine growth hormone, designed to increase milk production.  Both sides appealed to 
accounts of the natural, even by naming the product in different ways.  The euphemistic term 
‘bovine somatotropin’ implied a natural basis for a benign productive efficiency.  For critics, 
the term ‘hormone’ implied an unnatural chemical, by analogy to other capital-intensive 
innovations which had already harmed environmental quality, small-scale farming and its 
independence [7]. 
 
In general, environmentalist movements have recast 'nature' as a realm of purity, morality and 
fragility.  Speaking in such terms, they have reinvented the 'global environment' as an urgent 
issue.  They have portrayed environmental change as a serious global threat to be remedied or 
averted – by contrast to mainstream policy frameworks, which treat the environment as 
resources warranting expert management [8].   
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Catastrophic environmental change is more readily foreseen in the recent historical context, 
where industrialisation has destroyed not only ‘nature’ but also the nature/society dichotomy, 
argues Ulrich Beck.  As nature becomes ever more a casualty and an elusive historical 
product, its injuries are defined in diverse scientific, counter-scientific and socio-cultural 
ways.  At least implicitly, society debates the possible future of ‘nature’ as framed by culture, 
e.g. through technological capacity to mitigate past damage: 
Modernisation risks are the scientised ‘second morality’ in which negotiations are conducted on the injuries 
of the industrially exhausted ex-nature in a socially legitimate way, that is, with a claim to effective remedy 
[9].   
As risks are translated into scientifically measurable terms, e.g. for measuring or remedying 
harm, societal conflicts ‘lead to forms of scientisation of the protest against science’ [10].   
 
This process opens up plural cognitive frameworks for anticipating and controlling risks.  In 
cases where uncertainty and decision stakes are high, the stereotypical distinction between 
hard facts and soft values is readily inverted.  Soft facts become dependent upon hard values 
[11]. 
 
In particular, 'the environment' has become a terrain of contested social values, as Maarten 
Hajer argues.  Although environmental threats are often attributed to nature, they are always 
framed by policy agendas, through story-lines which selectively problematise some aspects of 
physical and social reality.  Narrative devices include images, causal models and metaphors.  
Environmental discourses define problems and structure reality so that some framings seem 
plausible, while others are foreclosed.  Rules which constitute the social order have no 
inherent power; rather, 'they have to be constantly reproduced and reconfirmed in actual 
speech situations, whether in documents or in debates' [12].  Each problem-definition implies 
a future scenario for ordering nature, society and technology. 
 
Contending frames drive policy conflict and change.  Often environmental change is turned 
into a public issue through apocalyptic discourses emphasising the fragility of nature, also a 
metaphor for social or economic vulnerability.  Pollution discourses portray industrial 
activities as immoral, social disorder [13].  
 
The above perspectives can mean that an issue involves two frames, but some environmental 
controversies feature interactions among multiple frames, each with its own discourse of the 
socio-natural order.  As a prominent schema along those lines, Cultural Theory analyses any 
controversy as three main political cultures, each promoting its own ‘myth of nature’, in turn 
justifying preferred social relations.  In particular, an individualist culture frames nature as 
benign − providing a cornucopian source of societal benefits, while restoring global 
equilibrium.  A hierarchist culture frames nature as ‘perverse/tolerant’, able to correct any 
perturbations within finite limits, beyond which it undergoes serious harm.  An egalitarian 
culture frames nature as ephemeral, inherently vulnerable to harm.  Each frame justifies 
policies which would licence, constrain or forbid industrial activities, respectively [14].   
 
Likewise this paper analyses European conflicts over agbiotech as three contending frames: 
eco-efficiency, managerialist and apocalyptic (see Table 1).  Our schema draws upon the three 
categories of Cultural Theory, though without supposing that the concomitant social relations 
are ‘preferred’ ones.  Through a managerialist frame, extra control measures extend operator 
responsibility and experimental designs for a controversial technology. 
2.2   Technological development as a real-world experiment 
Technological development can be analysed through the following questions:  In scaling up a 
technology, how are potential risks anticipated and tested in the real world?  What practices 
operate as experiments?  For those general questions, some theoretical perspectives will be 
sketched in their own right, before applying them to the case study. 
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Concepts of risk have shifted − ‘from technological, to socially constructed, to post-normal, to 
modernist, to a means through which society envisages its future’.  There is greater ‘pressure-
group activism on political and economic decision makers’, so that risk conflict is driven 
beyond any objective increases in risk.  Recognising those changes, new risk paradigms have 
the aim ‘of achieving closer proximity to real-world risk problems’ [15]. 
 
Regulatory science is normally devised and validated within cost constraints.  This means 
clearly distinguishing between merely ‘nice to know’ versus ‘need to know’ information for 
regulatory decisions [16].  Such information depends upon standard contexts and assumptions 
of product use, which are not so readily predictable and often become contentious. 
 
As a small-scale method to anticipate any risks, a laboratory test generally has strong 
boundary conditions for isolating the inside from its wider environment and thus for 
controlling variables.  On the one hand, this containment can ensure that any unexpected 
effects are negligible or reversible. On the other hand, lab tests have inherent limitations for 
anticipating any wider potential harm, so the resulting knowledge may have little relevance to 
everyday discourse and practice outside science [17].  According to Krohn and Weyer, the 
practical relevance of lab tests depends on bridging the gap between the two contexts: 
… if scientific knowledge is to be ‘applied’ in society, then either the existing boundary conditions for 
laboratory science must be adapted to those of society, or societal practice must be changed according to the 
standard set for laboratory science [18]. 
In practice, both those tendencies can operate simultaneously, by extending laboratory 
methods into larger-scale technological development (see Diagram 1, theory 2, lower right-
hand corner).  A ‘real-life experiment’ can test social assumptions through hypotheses about 
potential effects, controlled variation of parameters and an organised research process.  
Extending the normal limits of experimental science, however, means losing control over the 
boundary conditions.  Science is unaccustomed to ‘the dilemma of the responsibility for the 
risks emerging from such experiments’ [19].  
 
To fulfil that broader responsibility, ‘Risks entailed by interaction with the environment can 
only be investigated by means of implementation on the scale of the real world’.  If harm 
results, then it would be publicly unacceptable (and illegitimate) for the experimenters to 
blame human failure, unforeseen disturbances or unknown side-effects; such explanations 
would reveal weaknesses in the scientific disciplines involved.  Consequently, when science 
extends its disciplinary boundaries, ‘it becomes increasingly involved in negotiations 
concerning the conditions for the performance of experiments in and on society’ [20].  After 
this theoretical framework was first published in German, the key term Realexperimente was 
initially translated as real-life experiment and later as real-world experiment, which 
emphasises the wide range of actors involved.  A couple examples from Germany can 
illustrate the practical meaning. 
 
In negotiating local waste management, for example, the design process explicitly tested and 
managed human behaviour.  After a toxic waste site was found underneath a housing 
development in Bielefeld, public protest led to demands for a provisional way of planning a 
new site for waste disposal.  Rather than propose a specific plan, a new approach devised 
three criteria: repairability of faults, controllability to allow shutdown in an emergency, and 
retrievability of the contents.  These criteria were accommodated by an interim plan, so that 
the initial operation could gain more knowledge about whether human and technical 
components would behave as intended.  As a result, ‘the parameters of risk analysis could be 
checked in a real-life implementation’.  This approach was able ‘to take seriously the 
experimental character of the introduction of technology and to make the process socially 
transparent’ [21]. 
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Waste disposal methods too have been developed through real-world experiments.  Early 
methods were modelled on a closed-cycle economy, dependent on greater recycling, which 
generated new environmental hazards.  Criticisms led to alternative proposals.  Municipal 
authorities have sought ways to change and control the burden of household waste, in ways 
appropriate to new disposal methods.  Through a recursive learning process, ‘The 
experimental design tends to shift from purely instrumental to socio-technological 
experimentation’ [22].   
 
Moreover, such a process can help to legitimise socio-technical change: 
Negotiations take place between different stakeholders and ‘citizen scientists’ who participate as fully valued 
actors with respect to goals and management of surprises stemming both from social and natural systems…  
As real-world experiments are often part of the public’s everyday life, involvement of the public can deliver 
a more robust legitimation basis [23].   
 
Of course, any technological system is effectively experimental, in terms of testing 
assumptions about intended, unintended and even unanticipated effects.  More profoundly, 
safety depends upon implicit social models of human behaviour.  As cited above, a high-
profile controversial example is bovine growth hormone: when veterinary experts advised on 
its safety, their judgement assumed that farmers would always use the drug under specified 
conditions. Nuclear safety too depends on assumptions that operators’ judgements are reliable 
and trustworthy, with high stakes for harmful consequences.  Thus, according to Brian 
Wynne, safety depends on social norms: 
Indeed, the articulation of a risk assessment in real life becomes in effect a prescriptive framework for the 
technology, as the social assumptions underlying the risk assessment take on the role of tacit commitments 
that must prevail to validate the technology (and the assessment) [24]. 
Likewise regulatory procedures involve assumptions about ‘how society must be organised so 
that the technology will behave in accordance with established risk assessments’.  Such 
assumptions underpin the ‘grand social experiment’ of negotiating technologies [25].   
3  Expanding the regulatory scope for GM crops 
In the risk debate on GM crops, there has been a societal conflict about how to define the 
‘harm’ which must be prevented. This section analyses how contending discourses generated 
greater controversy, attributing moral meanings to risks and benefits.  Consequently, some 
governments expanded the regulatory scope for potential effects of GM crops.  To analyse the 
changes which ensued, this section draws on theoretical perspectives about risk framings 
(Diagram 1, left-hand side). 
3.1  Contending risk frames of agri-biotech 
As mentioned earlier, the agbiotech debate can be analysed as three contending risk frames: 
eco-efficiency, managerialist and apocalyptic (see Table 1).  Each portrays dangers and 
opportunities in ways which favour a specific future for society.  Each gives different moral 
meanings to agro-environmental change.  Such agri-biotech discourses originated in the 
1980s, though this survey emphasises more recent examples. 
[insert Table 1] 
 
From its eco-efficiency frame, the agri-biotech industry has promoted GM crops as modest, 
benign extensions of selective breeding.  It has diagnosed the societal problem as inefficient 
agricultural inputs, which can be remedied by more efficiently reaping nature’s cornucopian 
potential through agri-biotech.  GM crops bring environmental, agronomic and economic 
benefits.  In particular, herbicide-tolerant and pest- and disease-resistant plants are more 
economical for the farmer, as well as environmentally beneficial, according to an industry 
association [26]. 
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According to this eco-efficiency discourse, such multiple benefits strengthen societal 
responses to more intense market competition.  GM crops bring future benefits which 
overcome present problems: 
EuropaBio asks legislators to consider biotechnology as a part of the toolkit that will help European 
agriculture develop a more harmonious balance between food production and our surrounding environment. 
Evidence that GM crops are good for the environment and for the competitiveness of agriculture is mounting 
in those parts of the world that are already growing GM crops [27].  
Exemplifying this frame, the picture below depicts the double helix as a productive money 
tree, rewarding its investors [28]. 
 
 
 
In the apocalyptic frame, by contrast, GM crops pose risks which lie beyond credible 
management.  Early on, critics attacked agri-biotech for aiming 'to convert agriculture into a 
branch of industry' [29].  According to environmental NGOs, GM technology aggravates the 
problems of intensive agriculture.  Its products bring unpredictable, uncontrollable risks, 
while increasing farmers’ dependence on commodity inputs and multinational companies.  
Exemplifying this frame, the picture below depicts GM crops as pollutants which therefore 
must be ‘decontaminated’ [30]. 
 
 
 
 
According to an apocalyptic discourse, agri-biotech also undermines benign alternatives, in 
particular, less-intensive agricultural methods and high-quality products.  Representing 
mainly smaller-scale farmers, the Coordination Paysanne Européene advocates 
extensification measures, based on ‘remunerative agricultural prices and sustainable family 
farming, with multiple benefits for society’ [31].  Such farmers oppose GM crops as an 
industrial threat of greater dependence on multinational companies [32].  In France, the most 
prominent affiliate has emphasised threats to peasant expertise and livelihoods, rather than 
environmental risk [33].  In an analogous way, small-scale farmers in Italy have opposed GM 
crops as a threat to prodotti tipici, local specialty products. 
 
Since the late 1980s agri-biotech critics have popularised a series of ominous risk metaphors 
(see Diagram 1, lower-right corner).  Early on, critics emphasised the prospect of a ‘genetic 
treadmill’, by analogy to the pesticide treadmill of pests developing resistance to chemical 
insecticides. For example, GM herbicide-tolerant crops would spread the tolerance trait to 
related plants, and increased herbicide usage would favour the resistance trait, leading to 
‘superweeds’; likewise pest-resistant GM crops would generate resistant pests.  Since the 
mid-1990s critics warned that broad-spectrum herbicides would ‘sterilise’ farmland 
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biodiversity important for wildlife habitats.  More recently they have popularised alarm about 
‘genetic pollution’, as an environmental threat which would also deny consumers a choice to 
buy ‘pure’ non-GM products.   
 
New accounts of nature and its injuries followed from the three ominous metaphors − 
superweeds, sterilisation and GM pollution.  These metaphors associated GM crops with 
environmental dangers, even immoral behaviour, thus putting agri-biotech symbolically on 
trial.  These discursive frames helped to mobilise activists and to intensify public suspicion 
towards agri-biotech. 
 
In response to that conflict, a managerialist frame has sought to legitimise EU regulatory 
procedures through links between scientific evidence and extra-scientific issues.  According 
to the European Commission, its regulatory framework 
… aims to provide a high level protection of human health and the environment, legal certainty for operators, 
address public concerns, including ethical concerns, facilitate consumers’ choice, and thereby fosters further 
public confidence on the use of GMOs [34].  
However, ‘science-based regulatory oversight’ is ‘the expression of societal choices’ 
regarding biotechnology: rules should ensure that market mechanisms function effectively, so 
that safe products become available to accommodate consumer preferences [35].  This policy 
burdens risk regulation with high stakes for how risk is framed.  The rest of this section 
sketches how regulatory criteria eventually scientised the three ominous metaphors from the 
risk controversy, thus mediating between eco-efficiency and apocalyptic frames.  
3.2  Broadening regulatory criteria 
For regulating agri-biotech, 1990 EC legislation was designed to manage and clarify uncertain 
risks of each GM product before the commercial stage. Covering the environmental risks of 
GMOs, the Deliberate Release Directive 90/220 (henceforth the Directive)  mandated a case-
by-case system of formal risk assessments and consents for R&D field trials at national level, 
as a possible basis for market approval at the EU level.  Each member state must avoid 
'adverse effects to the environment and human health' from GM organisms [36].  Adverse 
effects were not specified in the legislation, so their definition depended on interpreting 
specific cases, initially prior to any significant public debate in most EU member states. 
 
In the mid-1990s safety claims regarded some potential undesirable effects as not ‘adverse 
effects’ or as not relevant to regulation of GM crops.  By contrast, some member states 
proposed that the risk assessment encompass a wider range of potential effects, in particular, 
genetic-treadmill scenarios of insect resistance and herbicide-tolerance.  Some also proposed 
that the risk assessment consider how herbicide-tolerant crops would involve a switch to 
broad-spectrum (or ‘total’) herbicides, which kill all other vegetation, thus potentially 
harming farmland biodiversity.  They sought additional experiments to clarify such effects 
and controls to prevent them.  According to the Commission, however, such requirements 
could be imposed only to prevent ‘adverse effects’, as narrowly defined then.  On this basis, 
in 1997-98 the Commission granted commercial authorisation to some GM crops [37]. 
 
Greater public protest led to a a broader risk assessment.  At the June 1999 meeting of the 
Environment Council, many member states declared that they would not consider further 
requests for commercial authorisation until new conditions were fulfilled.  This de facto 
moratorium led the EU to revise the Deliberate Release Directive along more stringent lines.  
It now included long-term and indirect effects of GM crops, as well as effects of any changes 
in management practices, e.g. any switch to broad-spectrum herbicides.   
 
In the late 1990s yet another risk issue arose: ‘GM contamination’.  Pollution discourses were 
popularised as a multiple metaphor, involving ‘unnatural’ genetic combinations, ‘filthy lucre’ 
perverting science, globalisation corrupting national sovereignty, as well as GM pollen 
 9 
‘contaminating’ non-GM crops [38].  Friends of the Earth Europe adopted a honeybee logo to 
symbolize 'unwitting agents of genetic pollution', i.e. long-distance unmanageable spread of 
pollen.  Initially this problem was framed in two different ways. According to the eco-
efficiency frame of the agri-biotech industry, the unintentional presence of GM material is 
manageable through routine measures, thus protecting the economic value of non-GM crops.  
According to the apocalyptic frame, ‘GM contamination’ threatens the environment, 
consumer choice and even democratic decision-making.   
 
In response to these discourses, new regulatory language reframed the segregation problem.  
The phrase ‘adventitious presence’ has denoted levels of GM material which remain 
technically unavoidable, despite the operator’s reasonable efforts to minimise that presence; 
this phrase implies a moral obligation to exercise and demonstrate such efforts through 
segregation measures.  As a more recent phrase, ‘coexistence’ expresses a policy aim to 
maintain farmer options through parallel systems for GM, conventional and organic crops.   
 
In sum, critics kept agri-biotech on continuous trial through ominous risk metaphors, thus 
associating GM products with irresponsible or immoral behaviour. Eventually EU regulatory 
frameworks translated these metaphors into technical-managerial criteria for measuring and 
controlling more potential effects (see again Table 1).  To manage the extra uncertainties, the 
authorities revised and re-interpreted the original legislation on agbiotech risk regulation. 
3.3  Extending the stepwise procedure 
From the start, EU agri-biotech regulation had adopted ‘the step-by-step principle’.  
According to international guidelines, GMOs should be made predictable by progressively 
decreasing physical containment.  Releases should follow ‘a logical, incremental, step-wise 
process, whereby safety and performance data are collected’ [39].  According to the 
Deliberate Release Directive, the scale of release is increased gradually, ‘but only if the 
evaluation of the earlier steps... indicates that the next step can be taken', i.e. safely [40].  In 
so far as scientific uncertainty can justify a precautionary or proactive approach, it ‘may be 
deemed necessary until a large and reassuring body of data has been accumulated and we can 
begin to treat the technology as familiar’ [41]. 
 
Initially the step-wise principle was interpreted to mean that controls could be entirely relaxed 
at the commercial stage.  Many expert advisors felt that risk assessment could not depend 
upon a particular manner of using a product, because such restrictions would be unfeasible at 
the commercial stage: 'If it needs special controls at that stage, then we have really lost it' 
[42].  For small-scale field trials in the mid-1990s, special measures confined the GM 
material, pending a regulatory decision on scale-up.  From the empirical results, proponents 
cited ‘no evidence of risk’ as an argument for product safety, thus warranting no special 
conditions on product use.   
 
However, special conditions were later imposed to address new agro-environmental issues.  
As described earlier, when the Directive was revised in the late 1990s, it required case-
specific monitoring: ‘the monitoring should confirm that any assumptions regarding the 
occurrence and impact of potential adverse effects of the GMO or its use in the environmental 
risk assessment (e.r.a.) are correct’ [43].  Thus it extended the stepwise principle into the 
commercial stage. 
 
Arguments continued over what ‘assumptions’ must be confirmed by monitoring commercial 
use, and whether some GM products would be exempt.  On behalf of the European 
Commission, DG-Environment drafted guidelines which eventually allowed some exemptions 
from the monitoring requirements, as follows: ‘Where the conclusions of the risk assessment 
identify an absence of risk or negligible risk, case-specific monitoring may not be required’ 
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[44].  This exemption came from an eco-efficiency frame, e.g. from the agbiotech industry 
and from DG-Trade within the Commission. 
 
The monitoring criteria became more contentious for specific GM products in 2003-2004, 
when European governments were once more deciding whether or how to support commercial 
approval of specific GM products.  Under the Deliberate Release Directive, companies 
submitted each notification for a GM product to a national Competent Authority (CA).  Then 
each member state could express views on the risk assessment and on appropriate 
requirements.  They judged what extra control measures may be warranted.  Initially those 
judgements remained unclear: ‘Regulators have no clear criteria for what may or may not be 
considered an assumption for the purposes of requesting case-specific monitoring’ [45].  The 
next section analyses EU-wide conflicts over such assumptions which need to be confirmed 
for specific GM products. 
4  Disputing agbiotech experiments 
In evaluating GM products for commercial approval from 2003 onwards, regulatory 
procedures considered ways to predict, test and/or prescribe the behaviour of agro-industrial 
operators who would handle the products.  This section analyses regulatory conflicts over 
how to design commercial use as ‘real-world experiments’ − firstly for the generic issue of 
herbicide effects, and then for three specific products.  
4.1  Broad-spectrum herbicides as a generic issue 
GM herbicide-tolerant (GMHT) crops allow farmers to replace selective herbicides with 
broad-spectrum ones, whose potential benefits were disputed.  From an eco-efficiency frame, 
GMHT crops help farmers to control weeds more efficiently, by delaying sprays until the 
post-emergence phase and/or reducing the quantities sprayed, thus benefiting the 
environment.  According to UK nature conservation agencies, however, such efficiency could 
turn the countryside into ‘green concrete’.  Broad-spectrum herbicides could reproduce 'the 
sterility of the greenhouse in open fields', thus causing a drastic reduction in wildlife already 
depleted by modern agricultural practices [46].  Nearly two-thirds of UK land is agricultural, 
so critics asked whether broad-spectrum herbicides would cause more harm to biodiversity 
around fields, as compared to the selective herbicides previously used.  Given that 
uncertainty, companies sought more evidence to justify commercial approval (see Table 1, 
penultimate row). 
 
The UK government funded large-scale, on-farm trials over a four-year period.  These Farm-
Scale Evaluations (FSEs) aimed to test herbicide effects on farmland biodiversity.  Through 
split-field trials, spraying GM herbicide-tolerant crops was compared to spraying their 
conventional counterparts.  The experiments were intended to justify an eventual decision 
about approving herbicide-tolerant crops: ‘The results of these farm-scale evaluations will 
ensure that the managed development of GM crops in the UK takes place safely’ [47].  At the 
time, the FSEs gave the government a scientific rationale for postponing a politically 
awkward decision. 
 
Elsewhere the FSEs have been analysed as a ‘regulatory experiment’, in the general sense that 
‘a policy needs to be put on trial, and an obvious regulatory purpose needs to be inscribed into 
the particular experimental design of the trial’ – in this case, ‘controlled conditions’ for GM 
crops [48].  Indeed, the FSEs were designed to test a prospective policy: namely, permitting 
commercial use, while setting only a maximum limit on herbicide usage, though the timing 
could matter more than the quantity.  To test such a policy, split fields provided an 
experimental ‘control’ or baseline for comparing biodiversity effects of the two different 
herbicide regimes.  
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In designing the trials, arguments arose over the appropriate comparators for GM crops.  
Those conflicts were accommodated by the experiment designers: ‘to fully represent the range 
of potential biodiversity effects, a full range of current conventional practices used in the UK 
should be included in the research programme’ [49].  Nature conservancy groups proposed 
that the design should include some conventional fields where farmers spray relatively less 
herbicides, to provide a more stringent comparator for broad-spectrum herbicides.  Accepting 
that proposal, the designers included ‘less intensive production systems’ in the trial fields 
[50].  Nevertheless, government advisors signalled design weaknesses and wider issues that 
would still leave ‘GM crops on trial’ afterwards [51]. 
 
From the FSEs, preliminary results indicated large environmental differences between GM 
and non-GM crops.  For two of the three crops, spring-sown oilseed rape and sugarbeet, much 
greater harm resulted from farmers spraying broad-spectrum herbicides, by comparison to 
spraying selective herbicides on their conventional counterparts.  For example, the GM fields 
had fewer weed seeds and insects important for bird diets [52].   
 
In response to those results, agri-biotech proponents argued that only the changes in herbicide 
use were ‘on trial’, not GM technology as such.  From an eco-efficiency frame, any harm was 
caused by weed-management measures, which could be flexibly adjusted to benefit wildlife.  
According to a Bayer representative: 
Activist groups claim that GM crops were in effect ‘green concrete’ and would ‘wipe out’ wildlife.  These 
studies show that this sort of scaremongering is not supported by the evidence [53]. 
In the case of the third crop tested, maize, relatively less harm resulted from spraying broad-
spectrum herbicides than selective ones, e.g. atrazine.  Since this herbicide was soon to be 
banned, NGOs criticised the comparison as invalid.  They also questioned whether the 
experimental designs were realistic models for commercial practice, i.e. whether they really 
simulated farmers doing ‘cost-effective weed control’.   
 
In its eventual advice, the UK advisory committee accepted the results of the trials as valid 
only for their specific conditions.  According to the government’s advisory committee, 
adverse effects would not result ‘if GMHT maize were to be grown and managed as in the 
FSEs’.  Given that atrazine would be phased out soon, however, alternative herbicides could 
change the unfavourable comparison of conventional maize with GMHT maize, so there must 
be a scheme ‘to monitor changes in conventional management practice’.  For GMHT spring-
sown oilseed rape, the expert body would not support commercial approval, unless companies 
submitted proposals and evidence for how the glufosinate sprays could be managed to 
minimise harm [54].  
4.2  Maize cultivation 
Farmland biodiversity issues became more specific for Bayer’s herbicide-tolerant T25 maize, 
which had already gained EU authorisation in 1998.  Each member state could set its own 
terms for cultivation, especially regarding herbicide usage (see Table 2, first product).  Citing 
the FSE evidence of environmental benefits, the UK government ultimately announced that it 
would approve the crop for the 2005 season, but with extra conditions:  First, herbicide 
spraying must follow the herbicide practices used in the FSEs or other practices ‘that have 
been shown not to result in adverse effects’.  Second, after 2006 further trials would be 
necessary to redo the environmental comparison with whatever herbicides replace atrazine.  
Moreover, for any non-GM farmer whose crop loses economic value as a result of gene flow, 
there would be a compensation scheme ‘to be funded by the GM sector’ [55]. 
   
[insert Table 2] 
 
In those ways, commercial cultivation was anticipated and designed as a semi-controlled 
experiment on farmer practices.  The FSEs were originally intended to simulate farmer 
 12 
behaviour and thus to predict environmental effects, as a realistic basis for relaxing control 
measures.  Instead expert advice now cited the empirical results to prescribe farmer practices, 
which themselves would need monitoring for compliance.  Thus the commercial stage was 
made conditional upon real-world experiments to test farmer practices regarding the two risk 
issues – farmland biodiversity and admixtures from gene flow. For segregation measures to 
avoid admixture, a compensation fund would give companies a financial incentive to enforce 
and monitor farmers’ compliance with guidelines. 
 
Having obtained a conditional go-ahead, Bayer Crop Science applauded the UK 
announcement – but withdrew its application.  According to the company:  
The Government has however placed a number of constraints on this conditional approval before the 
commercial cultivation of GM forage maize can proceed in the UK. The specific details of these conditions 
are still not available and thus will result in yet another 'open-ended' period of delay. These uncertainties and 
undefined timelines will make this five-year old variety economically non-viable [56]. 
New regulations should enable GM crops to be grown – not disable future attempts to grow them [57].    
The company declined to take responsibility for a commercial-scale experiment in a 
‘economically non-viable’ context.  Rules would impose extra burdens, e.g. post-market 
monitoring and financial liabilities of co-existence measures, yet this five-year-old variety 
would give farmers no clear benefits relative to other options [58].  In particular, T25 maize 
used an inferior germplasm, relative to other varieties more recently available.   
 
Moreover, regulators found difficulties in requiring a semi-controlled experiment at the 
commercial stage.  According to UK legal advice, the Directive provided no clear basis for a 
member state to require a specific herbicide regime, so the authorities withdrew their original 
proposal.  For various reasons, then, regulatory approval would depend upon predicting 
realistic effects − rather than prescribing or prohibiting their behavioural causes. 
4.3  Oilseed rape cultivation 
Under the revised Directive, Bayer Crop Science sought commercial authorisation for a 
herbicide-tolerant oilseed rape which had been delayed by the 1999 EU Council moratorium.  
Within its new application, the company included cultivation guidelines for growers.  
Although not required a priori, these guidelines would have statutory force, thus 
incorporating aspects of a managerialist frame into an experimental design.  Yet the 
company’s plan was criticised for optimistic assumptions.   
 
• Efficient weed control versus biodiversity? 
 
In its risk assessment, Bayer translated the ‘superweed’ scenario into managerialist terms.  
According to its guidance, farmers would efficiently use herbicides to keep fields clean of 
weeds. They planned multi-year field tests to evaluate weed-control methods, as well as any 
potential unexpected effects of this crop.  For the prospect of generating herbicide-tolerant 
weeds, the overall risk was assessed as nil, ‘taking into account the risk management 
strategies’ [59].   
 
Emphasising product efficiency, Bayer claimed that its stewardship programme would 
provide ‘cohesive guidelines for field management’ by farmers.  ‘Different networks of 
expertise are being consolidated in all countries by testing the efficiency of the herbicide and 
the performance of the varieties’.  According to the results available so far, ‘Standard Good 
Agricultural Practices provide adequate control of transgenic oilseed rape volunteers’, i.e. 
seeds which germinate after harvest [60].   
 
Thus the company proposed to manage herbicide-tolerant weeds as if they could be an 
adverse effect.  The case-specific monitoring plan was designed to confirm the company’s 
assumptions about the occurrence, impact and management of such weeds in particular.  The 
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monitoring would compare matched pairs of GM and non-GM oilseed rape fields.  The plan 
aimed to demonstrate that ‘the potential adverse effects identified in small-scale field trials 
(volunteers and outcrossing) are fully manageable in a practical way in farmers’ fields’ [61].  
Bayer would licence the herbicide-tolerance system to seed companies, rather than own and 
market the seed directly, thus complicating the locus of responsibility: ‘This means that 
stewardship becomes more difficult, requiring shared responsibility among stakeholders’ [62].   
 
Moralising the environment in its own way, the company also undertook to share 
responsibility with farmers, who faced a cultural conflict between efficient weed control and 
farmland biodiversity.  Consequently, a company manager foresaw the need for ‘cultural 
teaching’: 
… where the farmer can adapt the [spraying] practice according to the real weed infestation (due to post-
emergence application), it is possible to overcome this conflict… 
For example, we could leave part of each field unsprayed, which would provide an environmental benefit.  
We needn’t kill all the weeds.  Instead we can apply the herbicide only when and where necessary during the 
season.  But it is not farmers’ culture to leave weeds growing in the field. So we will need to do cultural 
teaching about the moral obligation of farmers to know the environmental consequences of their actions [63]. 
 
• Belgian rejection 
 
For Bayer’s marketing application to cultivate herbicide-tolerant oilseed rape, regulators 
considered all three risk issues from the public debate (see again Table 1, lower half; and 
Table 2, second product).  As rapporteur for the EU-wide procedure, the Belgium CA sought 
the views of its own advisors.  They emphasised the problem that oilseed rape can readily 
become a weed, as well as spreading its genes through pollen flow to other Brassica plants.  
For preventing this gene flow, the company’s guidelines would be essential, but they are ‘not 
all technically feasible’, so vertical gene flow ‘may not be controlled’, argued advisors. 
Therefore post-market monitoring must assess farmer compliance with the guidelines.  The 
advice also mentioned two other problems: adventitious presence of GM material, with 
problems for coexistence; and broad-spectrum herbicides allowing better weed control and 
thus ‘cleaner’ fields, i.e. less biodiversity in farmland [64]. 
 
Indeed, farmland biodiversity became a new regulatory issue through this case.  Belgian 
advisors initially accepted the company argument that the issue lay within regulation of 
pesticides, not GM crops.  However, Belgian anti-biotech campaigners circulated copies of 
the UK FSE results to the advisory body and held protest actions [65].  Ultimately Belgian 
experts reiterated the UK conclusion that ‘cost-effective weed control’ would result in adverse 
effects on farmland biodiversity, at least in the short term. Therefore the problem requires ‘a 
continued monitoring of continuously evolving agricultural practices’. Indeed, such an effort 
would be worthwhile for all pesticide usage, since it could have anticipated the decay of 
farmland biodiversity in recent decades, argued Belgian advisors [66].   
 
Citing that advice, the Belgian government decided to reject cultivation uses of the Bayer 
crop.  Its official rationale mentioned all three risk issues: herbicide-tolerant weeds, farmland 
biodiversity and admixture [67].  According to the Environment Minister, the broad-spectrum 
herbicide ‘kills food for birds, bees and everything else that lives in nature’, thus reclassifying 
farmland as nature [68].  Such apocalyptic language supported a decision that would avoid 
domestic and EU-wide conflict. 
 
The Belgian advisory body had implied the need to impose and monitor extra control 
measures on crop cultivation, but the government declined to attempt such an experiment.  
Instead it advocated approval only for grain import, not cultivation.  In response, Bayer 
criticised the government decision as political: ‘The experts raised some concerns but 
indicated that with proper controls it would be possible to cultivate this crop without 
impacting on the environment’, according to the company [69].  On the other side, Belgian 
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NGOs opposed even grain import, by arguing that the government should not encourage 
cultivation of such crops anywhere, ‘in view of their uncontrollable environmental and 
agricultural consequences’ [70].   
4.4  Rapeseed import  
For grain import only of GM products, companies expected the environmental risk 
assessment to be straightforward, warranting no special requirements.  ‘The grain handling 
system excludes grain from the environment’, according to a company regulatory manager 
(interview, April 2003).  For such products from Monsanto, the company claimed that any 
risk would be ‘effectively zero’.   
 
However, a proposal to import GM rapeseed provoked great conflict, partly about the 
weediness scenario (see Table 2, third product).  The company’s risk assessment made 
optimistic assumptions – e.g., that environmental release from grain imports can be prevented 
or managed, and that any escaped seeds that germinate would be readily displaced by other 
weeds.  Environmental NGOs criticised those assumptions.  Moreover, they argued, it would 
be unacceptable to spray extra herbicides on roadsides to control volunteers, and GM crops 
should be prohibited in centres of biodiversity for Brassica species [71].   
 
National experts and regulators anticipated that some grain could escape.  Italy objected that 
any escaped rapeseed could contaminate related plants, especially land races, and thus 
undermine its national centres of diversity for Brassica crops.  The UK advisory committee, 
concerned about ‘the segregation of transgenic and non-transgenic material’, asked that the 
company ‘include plans for monitoring and controlling establishment of feral populations as a 
result of seed spill’ [72].  Expert advisors were asking the company to test nearby populations 
for the herbicide-tolerance trait, as a means to confirm its optimistic assumptions.  
 
Taking up those issues, governments proposed extra conditions that would test and even 
prescribe importers’ behaviour.   According to the UK, any EU authorisation should include 
‘acceptable procedures to minimise seed spills’ and ‘active monitoring’, especially to confirm 
that populations of feral herbicide-tolerant oilseed rape do not emerge [73].  Likewise Danish 
experts proposed that EU approval should include control measures to prevent unintended 
dispersal during grain transport at harbours, as well as monitoring of any dispersal and gene 
transfer [74].   
 
Regulators disagreed about whether or how to impose such conditions – implicitly, about 
whether GM rapeseed import must be specially designed as a real-world experiment.  
According to the company, it could not feasibly take responsibility for extra control measures 
at ports or processing plants, which lay beyond its own authority.  Eventually the European 
Commission proposed to authorise the GM rapeseed import without such a requirement, thus 
accepting the company’s minimal plan as adequate [75].  When that proposal went for a vote 
to the regulatory committee in June 2004, more member states voted against approval than in 
favour [76].   
 
When the Commission ultimately granted approval a year later, this potentially held the 
company responsible for designing and monitoring commercial use as an experiment.  The 
official decision required ‘appropriate management measures to be taken in the case of 
accidental grain spillage’.  The Commission also announced a ‘Recommendation concerning 
measures to be taken by the consent holder to prevent any damage to health and the 
environment’ from accidental spillage [77].  
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5  GM crops kept on trial 
Like previous agricultural technologies, agbiotech has been turned into a legitimacy problem 
for government decision-making in Europe.  A metaphor of suspected crimes, ‘GM crops on 
trial’, has been extended into public debate and EU-wide regulatory procedures.  GM crops 
have been kept continuously on trial in three related ways: contending risk discourses which 
attribute moral meanings to the agricultural environment, safety tests which simulate 
commercial use, and special measures which assign greater responsibility to commercial 
operators.  All these elements intersect in regulatory conflicts over how to anticipate and 
design commercial use as a real-world experiment.  This section summarises how the analysis 
has drawn upon the theoretical perspectives surveyed earlier.   
5.1  Contending agri-environmental discourses 
The agri-biotech debate features contending moral frames about GM products conserving or 
degrading nature, as in many other agri-technological controversies [78].  Proponents and 
opponents have framed GM crops according to different moral visions of the socio-natural 
order (see Diagram 1, upper left corner; and Table 1, upper half). From their eco-efficiency 
frame, proponents have diagnosed the problem as agro-economic inefficiencies which GM 
crops can remedy; they have framed any unintended effects as routinely manageable problems 
of safe products.  By contrast, agri-biotech opponents have emphasised apocalyptic threats − 
e.g., of uncontrollable risks, intensive agricultural methods and farmer dependence on 
multinational companies.  They have counterposed benign alternatives, especially farm 
stewardship roles which have cultural resonances in each country – for example, farmland 
biodiversity in the UK, local specialty products in Italy, peasant craft skills in France, etc.  In 
these ways, eco-efficiency versus apocalyptic frames favour different future scenarios for 
linking nature, society and technology [79].   
 
Apocalyptic risk discourses have blurred official distinctions between environmental, 
agricultural and economic harm.  In recent decades, intensive cultivation methods had eroded 
any distinction between society and agricultural nature, whose injuries became more open to 
socio-cultural definitions, amenable to stigmatising agbiotech.  Risk metaphors have 
anticipated potential harm in ways which resonated with public concerns, e.g. about 
unaccountable economic forces imposing an irreversible future.  As culturally-believable 
diagnoses of societal problems, these risk discourses provided a collective action-frame for 
mobilising public support and pressurising governments [80]. 
 
Moreover, agbiotech opponents have framed risk in successively broader ways, thus 
expanding the charge-sheet of suspected crimes for which GM crops should be kept on trial.  
Their discourses have emphasised three ominous metaphors: ‘superweeds’ leading to a 
genetic treadmill, thus aggravating the familiar pesticide treadmill; broad-spectrum herbicides 
‘sterilising’ farmland biodiversity; and pollen flow ‘contaminating’ non-GM crops.  They 
have also cast doubt on whether preventive measures would be reliable, realistic or morally 
responsible.  In these ways, they have sought to undermine safety claims; indeed, they have 
cast the entire technological development as immoral, thus challenging eco-efficiency 
discourses of societal benefits (see Table 1, lower half).   
 
Through a managerialist frame, governments have mediated between eco-efficiency and 
apocalyptic frames, especially by translating the three ominous metaphors into measurable, 
manageable effects.  By treating ‘contamination’ as ‘adventitious presence’, for example, they 
scientised the risks and thus the protest [81].  More national authorities took up those risk 
issues, which readily became European ones through interactions between activists and 
regulators.  Governments defined harm more stringently, thus generating more uncertainty 
about whether GM crops could cause harm.  Indeed, fact-finding for risk knowledge became 
dependent upon value-laden accounts of harm, especially pollution [82]. 
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5.2  Real-world experiments 
Regulatory science conventionally identifies testable characteristics of a product within 
standard contexts of its use, as a basis to distinguish between knowledge which is necessary 
or merely ‘nice to know’ [83].  For GM crops the ‘step-wise procedure’ was originally meant 
to provide the knowledge necessary to relax control measures for ‘safe products’ at the 
commercial stage.  As critics warned against ‘uncontrollable risks’ of GM products, however, 
a managerialist frame evaluated a broader range of potential harm than before.  The ‘step-wise 
procedure’ was extended into proposals for the commercial stage.   
 
Regulators requested more knowledge about operator behaviour and diverse agri-
environmental conditions − contexts which could not be standardised in advance.  Risk 
assessments increasingly made assumptions or prescriptions about the operator behaviour 
necessary to avoid harm.  Control measures assigned greater legal-moral responsibility to 
agro-industrial operators, including seed companies, grain importers, farmers, etc. (Diagram 
1, lower middle part).   
 
The original policy problem, evaluating ‘product safety’, was reconstructed by keeping GM 
crops on trial in the experimental sense.  Although the Commission policy was ‘science-based 
regulatory oversight’, new practices extended the disciplinary boundaries of science.  The 
commercialisation stage was now anticipated and designed as a real-world experiment. Such 
designs would test assumptions about human practices as well as their environmental effects 
[84].  These steps towards commercialisation could be justified as cautious ways to generate 
knowledge for risk assessment, thus providing moral licence for a technological scale-up 
(Diagram 1, upper right-hand corner). 
 
The agri-production chain was being effectively turned into a social laboratory for operator 
behaviour.  Farmer discipline was needed to control weeds, or to protect some weeds as 
biodiversity, or to do both at once – aims which may be mutually conflicting.  As farmers 
were assigned a role as environmental stewards, their potential behaviour became a focus for 
greater monitoring, control and self-discipline.  For cultivating the most controversial GM 
crop (oilseed rape), a company planned moral education for farmers, so that herbicide sprays 
would minimise harm to farmland biodiversity.  For the import of GM rapeseed, some 
member states now sought extra measures to limit and monitor any spillage, which could lead 
to harmful herbicide sprays. 
 
Conflicts arose about whether operator behaviour could be feasibly reorganised around the 
necessary social discipline to prevent harm, and thus about how to design a technological 
scale-up (see again Table 2) [85].  For the prospect that gene flow would generate herbicide-
tolerant weeds, a biotech company devised control measures for farmers to maintain ‘clean’ 
weed-free fields, but expert advisors questioned whether such measures were feasible.  For 
the prospect that broad-spectrum herbicides would harm farmland biodiversity, farm-scale 
trials were originally intended to simulate cultivation practices and thus predict their 
environmental effects, as a basis to make a regulatory decision on commercial use.  However, 
those cultivation practices were later made prescriptive, as rules to be enforced and monitored 
for compliance.  For the prospect that GM crops would ‘contaminate’ non-GM crops, national 
measures assigned legal responsibility and liability to companies, thus involving them in 
farmer discipline.  All these potential control measures became contentious in European 
regulatory procedures during 2004.   
 
Those procedures have undergone tensions between predicting, testing and prescribing 
operator behaviour.  Conflicts arose over the necessity or feasibility of control measures 
which would extend operator responsibility through real-world experiments.  By generating 
these regulatory conflicts, the apocalyptic frame somewhat achieved its aim: to impede or 
deter further commercialisation of GM products. 
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6  Links among theoretical perspectives 
This case study has given complementary roles to three theoretical perspectives: issue-
framing, agri-environmental discourses, and real-world experiments.  This final section 
elaborates how the case study links and develops those perspectives, especially for their 
policy implications (see again the boxes in Diagram 1).   
   
Other case studies have analysed agri-environmental discourses as contending moral visions 
for agri-technological change.  In particular, agrochemicals and bovine growth hormone were 
attacked as techno-fixes which evade or even aggravate the sources of socio-environmental 
problems.  Farmers’ roles as environmental stewards became a focus for ‘moralising the 
environment’, by attributing moral meanings to their behaviour and its environmental effects 
[86].   
 
Building upon those perspectives, this case study links environmental discourses with issue-
framing, by analysing interactions among three frames [87].  Amidst two frames promoting or 
opposing agbiotech, regulatory authorities elaborated a distinct managerialist frame, 
incorporating and synthesising elements of the other two.  New managerialist procedures 
scientised the ominous metaphors through efforts to control ‘uncontrollable risks’, while 
mediating between the antagonistic frames, though without a clear outcome for 
commercialising the products.   
  
In science and technology studies, other case studies have analysed how technological 
development is designed and managed as a real-world experiment – e.g. by extending, testing 
and adjusting control measures at the commercial stage.  In some sectors, e.g. household or 
toxic waste disposal, the experimental design has been socially negotiated in ways which 
could manage or reduce social conflict.  Wider deliberative participation through real-world 
experiments can help legitimise decisions [88]. 
 
In this case study, however, opponents stigmatised agri-biotech as pollution, turning the entire 
development into a Europe-wide legitimacy problem.  The managerialist frame broadened the 
policy problem by experimentalising the commercial stage, yet its design became contentious.  
These difficulties are illuminated by linking perspectives on agri-environmental discourses 
and real-world experiments.  
 
What broader lessons can be drawn from this case?  According to Hajer, an environmental 
discourse can be appropriated for various agendas – for example, by protest movements for 
blocking a development, or by political elites for taking responsibility for a common societal 
problem.  He further distinguishes between two managerial approaches: ‘environmental 
mediation’ and ‘reflexive institutional arrangements’.  Through environmental mediation, an 
elite group deliberates possible solutions to environmental problems: this procedure may need 
to delimit the problem-definition in order to reach internal consensus.  By contrast, through 
reflexive institutional arrangements, a broader social process would reconsider the basis of 
environmental knowledge and ‘can therefore never be based on preconceived problem 
definitions’.  Reflexive practices should ‘be oriented towards constructing the social problem’ 
that needs a solution in socially inclusive ways.  These would discuss diverse possibilities for 
social order, e.g. in terms of ‘what constitutes pollution’ [89]. 
 
Juxtaposed with Hajer’s two managerial models, this case study mainly illustrates 
environmental mediation, though with some reflexive elements.  For agbiotech a 
managerialist frame reflexively broadened the original policy problem − from assessing 
product safety, to designing real-world experiments.  Political elites could take responsibility 
for a new common problem: keeping GM products on trial, while judging whether a particular 
experiment was acceptable.  EU agbiotech regulation can be seen as predominantly an elite 
project: environmental mediation tested social assumptions about human practices and their 
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potential effects.  Through greater reflexivity, regulatory procedures incorporated more 
conflicts − over operator self-discipline, appropriate control measures, and diverse accounts 
of pollution.   
 
According to Commission policy, EU ‘science-based regulatory oversight’ is the basis for 
‘societal choices’ regarding agbiotech.  This role poses a fundamental difficulty − raising the 
political stakes for regulatory decisions, but allowing little scope to deliberate visions of the 
socio-natural order.  Real-world experiments can help to manage legitimacy problems but not 
to overcome them.  This tension indicates both the reflexive potential and limitations of a 
policy framework which regulates biophysical ‘risk’ of a contentious innovation.   
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TABLES 
 
 
Table 1: Three Contending Risk-Frames for GM Crops 
 
 
 
 
Eco-efficiency/cornucopian 
agri-biotech business, e.g. 
Europabio, some farmers 
Managerialist 
regulatory agencies, e.g. 
DG-Environment & national 
regulatory agencies 
Apocalyptic 
environmental NGOs, 
Coordination Paysanne, 
Green MEPs 
Agricultural 
problem 
inefficient farm inputs, 
uncompetitive outputs 
uncertain biophysical effects 
of a new technology 
intensive monoculture, 
farmer dependence on 
MNCs, pesticide treadmill 
Nature seen 
as 
cornucopian potential to be 
reaped  
resources to be managed and 
protected 
fragile resources under 
threat from uncontrollable, 
irreversible risks 
GM crops 
seen as 
safe eco-efficient tools to 
gain economic & 
environmental benefits 
potential hazards to be 
evaluated and managed  
pollutants threatening the 
environment, democracy and 
societal values 
Solution apply routine management 
measures 
design research and controls 
to manage uncertainty 
block or deter GM products 
1) herbicide-
tolerant 
weeds 
manage this agronomic 
problem through product 
stewardship, e.g. standard 
Good Agricultural Practices 
(GAP) 
evaluate control measures 
and their feasibility for this 
agro-environmental problem 
(which could affect 
herbicide usage) 
prevent ‘genetic treadmill’ 
& ‘superweeds’ which 
would perpetuate  
agrochemical dependence 
 
2)  
harm to 
farmland 
biodiversity 
from ‘total’ 
herbicides 
use herbicides more 
efficiently and so reduce 
environmental harm  
Bayer: plan moral teaching 
for farmers. 
test relative harm of broad-
spectrum and selective 
herbicides – effects 
contingent upon farmer 
practices 
prevent herbicides from 
sterilising the countryside 
into green concrete 
3) mixture 
of GM and 
non-GM 
crops 
protect non-GM crops 
through standard isolation 
distances (for each crop) 
limit adventitious presence 
through national measures 
for segregation and co-
existence 
prevent ‘genetic 
contamination’ –  but 
impossible or difficult  
 
Abbreviations 
GAP: Good Agricultural Practices 
MEP: Member of the European Parliament 
MNC: multinational companies 
NGO: non-governmental organisation 
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Table 2: Managerialist Risk-Frames as Experimental Designs 
 
Note:  National Competent Authorities (CAs) and their expert advisory bodies have attempted 
to impose extra conditions upon GM products under the Deliberate Release Directive.  The 
managerialist risk-frame (in Table 1) was operationalised by designing commercial use as an 
experiment.   This table summarises conflicts over specific herbicide-tolerant (H-T) crops, 
regarding the three risk issues.   
 
 
 
 
Bayer’s herbicide-
tolerant maize for 
cultivation 
Bayer’s herbicide-
tolerant oilseed rape 
(OSR) for cultivation 
Monsanto’s 
herbicide-tolerant 
OSR for import only 
Regulatory proposals 
and decisions 
 
EU-wide approval already 
granted in 1998, but each 
country can restrict 
herbicide usage. 
UK proposed approval with 
extra conditions in March 
2004, but Bayer withdrew 
application 
Belgium decided not to 
support EU approval for 
cultivation in February 
2004. 
 
CAs demanded special 
conditions to monitor 
and control escape of 
grain. 
Commission decision 
partly accommodated 
those demands  
Risk issues  
 
   
1) herbicide-tolerant 
weeds:  
evaluate control 
measures and their 
feasibility for this agro-
environmental problem 
(not a major issue for 
maize) 
Bayer planned product 
stewardship for farmers 
to eliminate volunteer 
weeds for ‘clean’ fields. 
Belgian advisers 
doubted feasibility of 
Bayer’s plan. 
UK proposed 
preventive measures 
and ‘active monitoring’ 
of feral populations, to 
verify the company 
reassurances about 
seed containment.  
2) farmland 
biodiversity:  
test relative effects of 
total (broad-spectrum) 
and selective herbicides 
through Farm-Scale 
Evaluations (FSE) 
FSEs showed relatively less 
harm from GM maize. 
UK advisers supported 
authorisation only if 
farmers use herbicides as in 
the FSEs.  Regulators 
adopted that advice for 
their decision. 
FSEs showed relatively 
greater harm from GM 
OSR. 
UK advisers did not 
support authorisation. 
Belgian advisers noted 
the unfavourable results 
of UK FSEs. 
NGOs argued that it 
would be unacceptable 
to spray total 
herbicides on roadside 
areas.  To avoid any 
need for sprays, UK 
advisers sought to 
prevent spillage. 
3) mixture of GM and 
non-GM products:  
limit adventitious 
presence through co-
existence measures set 
at national level 
UK would require 
companies to fund any 
compensation to non-GM 
farms whose crops lose 
economic value. 
Belgian advisers noted 
the segregation problem. 
UK advisers expressed 
concern about 
segregation.  But  
Monsanto defended 
routine procedures as 
adequate.   
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